staff to develop their own standards, and generally adopt standards developed by industry associations (examples being local building, electrical and plumbing codes and the vehicle emissions standards adopted by the California Air Resources Board (CARB) 4 ).
In February 2011, a biodiesel producer in New Mexico sought to enjoin ASTM from adopting a standard specification for triglyceride burner fuel that would cap the allowable amount of biodiesel blended with petroleum-based diesel fuel at five percent. 5 The biodiesel producer argued that adoption of the standard would exclude it from the relevant market because the standard would become the law by reference in over thirty
states, but the court denied the request for injunction due to the lack of imminent harm. 6 The court ultimately dismissed all of the biodiesel producer's claims, holding that the producer failed to allege a plausible antitrust violation because it could compete in the relevant market despite the adoption of the standard. 7 Many federal agencies, too, adopt privately-developed standards both for the sake of expediency and because the relevant technical data is often in the hands of industry. 8 The Federal Office of Management of Budget's (OMB) guidelines for Federal agencies require that agencies adopt suitable "voluntary consensus standards" in their procurement and regulatory activities except to the extent "inconsistent with law or otherwise impractical". 9 At an international level, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Uruguay
Round Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade requires that if recognized international standards exist with respect to a technical area, national governments developing standards in that area must adopt such international standards as the basis for their own national standards. 10 may employ internal technical experts to develop standards, test products and investigate incidents of non-compliance. These agencies operate under the general "notice and comment" rulemaking procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 11 and, though they work independently, rely heavily on technical input and expertise from industry and consumer groups. 12 Multiple rounds of "negotiation" with industry representatives typically occur before any significant standard is adopted, and even after adoption federally-mandated standards are subject to challenge under the APA and to revocation if found to be arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 13 
Voluntary Standards. Organizations that develop voluntary
standards are referred to generally as standards-development organizations (SDOs).
SDOs vary greatly in size and composition. Some, which are sometimes referred to as consortia or "special interest groups" (SIGs), 14 may consist of just a few companies that collaborate on a narrow set of technical specifications, sometimes for a single product.
Standards for consumer electronics devices and media such as the DVD disc and player were developed in this manner. Other SDOs are very large and encompass many different standardization activities at any given time. ASTM International, for example, is one of the largest SDOs and regularly develops standards in areas as diverse as electrical wiring, playground equipment, composite materials, unmanned aircraft and nanotechnology. 15 Voluntary standards, particularly those in fields such as computing, telecommunications and networking, are typically interoperability standards, though
SDOs may also adopt quality, informational and prophylactic standards. Conformity with governmental and other mandatory standards is typically a matter of legal compliance and can be monitored internally, subject to periodic regulatory inspection, or through more formal standards conformity assessments. In some areas, 7 third party organizations have evolved to measure and certify compliance with both mandatory and voluntary standards. Underwriters Laboratories (UL), for example, serves as an independent product certification body for both governmental and nongovernmental standards, including clean energy technologies such as photovoltaics and wind turbines. 20 NIST and other governmental agencies also provide conformity assessment services, and in areas such as eco-labeling and climate change, a plethora of private third party certifying groups has arisen. 21 The growing role of third party certifiers has been viewed by some commentators with concern, as there is little oversight or regulation of such third party certifiers, making it difficult to detect and prevent potential bias and lack of competence. 44 In general, however, Energy Star guidelines are more stringent than mandatory federal efficiency standards which have been set for products such as light bulbs, dishwashers, dehumidifiers, refrigerators and clothes washers. 45 Moreover, though definitions of "energy efficiency" vary, many states have also adopted energy efficiency targets and standards directed primarily toward power generators. 46 
3.6
Smart Grid. The "smart grid" refers to a next-generation, distributed national power grid that when implemented will enable two-way communication and
power transmission between generators, consumers and intermediate points. 47 It is hoped that implementation of the smart grid will dramatically improve the efficiency of power generation and consumption in the United States. 48 Under EISA, NIST is directed to coordinate the development of a new interoperability framework for the smart grid. 49 In 2010 NIST announced the first 75 standards in this framework, covering technologies ranging from electricity storage to utility metering to cyber security. 50 These standards were selected from existing specifications and standards developed by NIST itself as well as other governmental agencies (e.g., Department of Homeland Security), international bodies (e.g., the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and International
Telecommunications Union (ITU)), ANSI-accredited SDOs (e.g., IEEE and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)), and private consortia (e.g., HomePlug
Powerline Alliance and the Zigbee Alliance).
Since 2010, NIST has continued developing an interoperability framework for the smart grid. In July 2011, NIST added the first six standards to the SGIP Catalog of
Standards covering technologies such as internet protocols, energy usage information, electric vehicle plugs, and upgrading household electric meters to smart meters. 51 In
October 2011, NIST released a draft of version 2.0 of its interoperability framework for the smart grid, which added twenty standards to the framework to help fill gaps identified in version 1.0. 52 Additionally, NIST and the Smart Grid Co-Ordination Group of the European Union jointly published a white paper expressing their intent to collaborate to ensure a consistent set of smart grid standards. 53 Among the many challenges that will face implementers of Smart Grid products will be understanding and complying with the many different SDO rules and policies associated with this wide assortment of standards.
(See Section 4.3 regarding patent policies.)
3.7
Building Sustainability. Residential and commercial buildings consume significant quantities of energy and otherwise impact the environment in terms of their construction, materials and ongoing cooling, heating, lighting and operations. 54 Accordingly, significant attention has recently been paid to standards and specifications for "green" and "sustainable" buildings, 55 and there has been a proliferation of standards relating to sustainability. 56 Among the most widely-recognized of such standards is the LEED building certification system administered by the U.S. Green Building Council, which rates buildings based, among other things, on siting, water efficiency, energy conservation, materials and indoor environmental quality. 57 In When published in final form (expected in 2012), the IGCC will be available for adoption by jurisdictions on a mandatory basis. 59 Despite the proliferation of standards relating to building sustainability, materials sustainability standards lack a consistent vocabulary, as well as a consistent and transparent means for measuring and testing sustainability criteria. 60 These issues make sustainability standards difficult to compare in a meaningful way, which is further complicated by the fact that many standards purport to certify the same, or very similar, product characteristics. technologies and infrastructure. 62 The EVSP plans to produce a strategic roadmap of the standards and conformity assessment programs that are necessary for the widespread acceptance and deployment of electric vehicles. 63 The EVSP has identified the need working groups to focus on standards in areas ranging from energy storage systems and vehicle components to charging systems and infrastructure user interface. 64 
Intellectual Property and Standards
Standards often implicate and are affected by intellectual property. Indeed, standards themselves may specify patentable inventions, and the written embodiments of standards are generally protectable by copyright. Furthermore, the more complicated the technology is that a standard specifies, the more likely the standard is to implicate patents owned by members of the SDO or by third parties. SDOs and implementers of technical standards are therefore likely to encounter numerous intellectual property issues outlined in this section.
Copyright in Standards.
Technical standards typically take the form of written descriptions of how products or services should be designed, built or operated.
As written documents, standards are typically protected by copyright, meaning that they cannot be reproduced, displayed or modified without permission of the copyright owner (often the SDO). Many SDOs earn significant revenue from the sale of standards (some of which extend to hundreds of pages) and warn against illegal copying and distribution, 65 though a number of major SDOs allow their standards to be downloaded and copied without charge. 66 The tension between copyright protection of standards and the social utility of standards becomes particularly clear when a proprietary standard is of a copyrighted standard may become mandatory by statute or regulation, yet access to that standard can be controlled by the SDO that owns the copyright. Medical Ass'n., Practice Management Information Corp., desiring to publish the CPT standard, sought a declaratory judgement that the AMA no longer possessed a valid copyright on the CPT after the HCFA mandated use of the CPT standard. 72 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit declined to hold the AMA's copyright invalid and affirmed that the AMA may control the copyrighted text of the CPT standard, even as adopted into law. 73 This approach is consistent with the OMB's guidance to Federal agencies, which states that agencies adopting voluntary consensus standards "must observe and protect the rights of the copyright holder." en banc Fifth Circuit, relying on precedent that copyright cannot prevent the reproduction and distribution of "the law", held that while SBCCI retains copyright in its model codes, once they are enacted into law, they may be reproduced and distributed freely. 76 Important to the court's reasoning was the fact that SBCCI's model codes were developed specifically to be adopted by municipalities into their local building codes.
The court distinguished this case from one in which a governmental agency simply incorporates an extrinsic standard into its regulations by reference, noting precedent in at least two other circuits holding in favor of the SDOs in such cases. 77 SDOs often see the licensing of standards as revenue sources, and claim that the development of standards requires copyright ownership as an incentive. 78 Widespread adoption of the standard, however, creates tension between society's need for access to the standard and the SDO's financial interest in controlling reproduction of the standard.
4.2
Patenting and Standards.
Patents Covering Standardized Technology.
As noted above, standards are written descriptions of particular attributes of specified products and services. A simple biofuel standard might specify, for example, that in order to be certified as a "Type X" biofuel, a mixture must contain at least 80% ethanol and no less than 3% of substance X. Assuming that statutory requirements of utility, novelty and non-obviousness are overcome, a patent could be obtained on a biofuel that conforms with this standard, or the methods of producing, storing or utilizing it. Such a patent would ordinarily not be obtained by the SDO in which the standard was developed, as SDOs seldom develop complete products and almost never seek to patent their work.
Rather, if such a patent were obtained, it would be obtained by a participant in the SDO or an outsider, and sometimes both. Two general patent-related issues thus arise in the context of technology standardization; these are referred to as patent stacking and patent ambush.
Patent Stacking and Patent
Pools. Patent or royalty "stacking", also referred to as a patent "thicket" or anti-commons, is said to occur when multiple entities each hold patents claiming aspects of a single standardized technology. 79 In order for a producer to implement the standardized technology in a product, it must obtain licenses from multiple parties, each acting independently and each seeking to maximize its gains. The risk of stacking is thus that the sum of individual royalty demands may be excessive in relation to the overall value of the product, making the standardized product uncompetitive in comparison to products that do not conform with the standard.
One method of addressing stacking concerns is through the creation of a patent pool. In a patent pool, multiple patent owners contribute or license patents that are essential to the implementation of the standard to a common agent (sometimes one of the patent holders and sometimes a newly-formed entity). Licensees are charged a single royalty to practice the entire group of patents, and net revenues are allocated among the pool participants in accordance with a pre-determined formula. Such pools have been used effectively in connection with consumer electronics standards such as the MPEG audio compression format, 80 the DVD video compression format 81 and third generation wireless communications standards. 82 In each of these cases the U.S. Department of Justice approved the proposed patent pool, provided that it possessed certain features that are viewed to lessen potentially anticompetitive effects. For example, such pools must contain only patents "essential" to the implementation of the standard (as the inclusion of patents on substitute technologies could lessen competition among technical alternatives), licensees must have the freedom to obtain licenses to the patents independently from the pool, licensing of the pooled patents must be conducted on a non-discriminatory basis, and to the extent that the patent pool owners require licensees to "grant back" licenses to them, such grantback licenses must only cover patents that are, themselves, essential to implementation of the standard. 83 It is important to note that the utility of a patent pool may be limited to the extent that fewer than all holders of essential patents become members of the pool. Such a situation arose recently with respect to the Federal Communication Commission's (FCC)
ATSC standard for digital television transmission. Though a patent pool comprising many holders of patents essential to implementation of the mandatory ATSC standard was formed, one patent holder, Japan's Funai Electric Company, did not join the pool and sought to charge royalties for a single patent at a rate equal to the rate charged by the entire ATSC pool. 84 When Funai sought to bar imports of televisions by Vizio, Inc., a U.S. manufacturer that refused to pay this royalty, Vizio sought temporary relief from the FCC. Though the matter was rendered moot when the Federal Circuit held that Vizio did not infringe the asserted patent, 85 the dispute highlights the fragility of patent pooling arrangements that do not include all relevant patent holders.
Patent Ambush.
The second major patent issue that arises in the standards context is patent ambush, also known as "hold-up", which occurs when a patent holder seeks to assert a previously unidentified patent against implementers of a standard after the standard has been adopted (either by an SDO or a governmental agency). 86 If patent hold-up occurs after the industry has devoted significant resources to production, marketing and training with respect to standardized products (in economic terms, after the standard has become "locked-in"), unexpected royalty demands from patent holders can have an extremely disruptive effect on the market, driving up the cost of standardized products to levels that are inefficient and uncompetitive with alternative technologies. patents is perceived as particularly serious because, unlike non-participating third parties, SDO participants can potentially shape the technical parameters of a standard toward their own patent positions. In response, many SDOs have adopted formal policies that attempt to address these issues by imposing one or both of the following obligations on participants: (1) an obligation to disclose patents essential to implementation of a standard, and/or (2) an obligation to license patents essential to implementation of a standard, either on a royalty-free basis or on terms that are "reasonable and nondiscriminatory." 88 Such obligations are intended to ensure that standards developers have at their disposal sufficient information to assess the relative costs and risks of technologies under consideration for standardization. That is, disclosure obligations ensure that standards developers know whether and which patents cover technologies under consideration, giving them the opportunity to "design around" patents if they so wish, and licensing obligations ensure that such patents will be licensed on terms that are, at least roughly, understood. consent order permanently restricting Dell from enforcing those patents against any third party. The Dell decision remains controversial, as there was no allegation that the Dell representative knew of Dell's pending patent or the potential for infringement at the time the VL-bus standard was adopted. 91 In response, SDO policies today often specify that searches of corporate patent portfolios not be required to comply with SDO disclosure requirements, or that disclosure be limited to the "knowledge" of an SDO participant's individual employees participating in standards development. 92 The most notorious incidence of disclosure failure within an SDO involved the semiconductor technology vendor Rambus, Inc. Volumes have been written about the decade-long legal battles in which Rambus sought to assert various dynamic random access memory (DRAM) patents against the entire DRAM industry after those technologies had been standardized by the Joint Electron Device Engineering Council (JEDEC), a voluntary SDO in which Rambus participated in the early 1990s. 93 Ultimately, Rambus was exonerated with respect to the allegations that it violated JEDEC's patent disclosure rules, primarily due to the vagueness of the rules themselves.
In one often-cited case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit criticized the JEDEC policy as suffering from "a staggering lack of defining details" that left SDO participants with "vaguely defined expectations as to what they believe the policy requires". 94 The court excused Rambus's behavior on the basis that the poorly-crafted JEDEC policy was simply too imprecise an instrument to support liability. It concluded that, "while such actions impeach Rambus's business ethics, the record does not contain substantial evidence that Rambus breached its duty under the … policy." 95 In a subsequent action, the FTC found Rambus liable, among other things, for attempted monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and deceptive conduct under Section 5 of the FTC Act. 96 The FTC's decision, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which held that Rambus's attempt to increase prices following adoption of a standard did not amount to anticompetitive conduct unless such conduct also resulted in adoption of the standard, which was not shown. 97 This decision has been criticized, both on the basis of its antitrust analysis and as a matter of public policy inasmuch as it seemingly condoned conduct that has been widely condemned as deceptive. F/RAND licensing commitments tend to fail because there is no universal, objective standard by which "reasonableness" (or "nondiscrimination") can be measured. 104 In order to make a F/RAND determination, the specific facts of each situation must be evaluated. These facts include not only relevant market norms for royalties, but also customary practices relating to non-royalty terms such as reciprocity, grantback licenses, defensive suspension, confidentiality and the like. Also, given that a patent holder's F/RAND licensing terms are generally not revealed until negotiations occurring after a standard has been adopted (i.e., "locked-in"), parties involved in standards setting can experience uncertainty regarding the ultimate cost of adopting a standard encumbered by patents. Put another way, the uncertainty of F/RAND licensing may simply substitute the risk of patent hold-up arising from unknown patents with holdup arising from unknown F/RAND licensing terms. would alleviate the F/RAND hold-up problems described above. 106 Such advance disclosure, it is argued, would enable SDO participants to evaluate the cost of including particular patented technologies in a standard prior to adoption, and would thus enable more efficient decision making with respect to the technical design of the standard.
Critics of ex ante disclosure, however, argue that ex ante disclosures in the standards context present both practical and legal issues. The introduction of legal licensing terms to the technical standards development process might cause the process to become more cumbersome, lengthy and expensive. 107 Concerns have also been raised that allowing ex ante licensing negotiations could facilitate the improper exchange of information among competitors and might place too much power in the hands of licensees acting collectively. That is, potential implementers of a standard, in negotiating ex ante license terms with a patent holder, could collectively exert anticompetitive pressure on the patent holder, causing royalties to decrease below their fair (or optimal) level. 108 Following this argument to its logical conclusion, group pressure could drive all royalty rates toward zero, resulting in the devaluation of any patents covering a standard. certification) to a product or service. Such "certification marks" may be registered by the SDO with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office in a manner similar to trademarks, though they differ from trademarks in several important regards. Whereas trademarks are used to indicate the origin of a product or service and thereby to assure its quality to the consumer, certification marks are used to indicate compliance by a product or service with a particular standard of quality, without regard to its origin. 113 Certification marks may be applied to goods or services by any organization adhering to the relevant standard, but may not be applied by the mark's owner. 114 Moreover the holder of the certification mark must allow any organization that complies with the standard to apply the mark, 115 essentially creating, as McCarthy has observed, a compulsory licensing scheme for certification marks. 116 Violation of the foregoing requirements can result in cancellation of the certification mark.
117
Margaret Chon has noted several weaknesses in current U.S. law governing certification marks. 118 In recent years, numerous certification marks purport to indicate to consumers various characteristics about a product, such as compliance with an organic farming or fair trade standard. 119 However, in a global marketplace with widespread supply chains, the consumer and competitors are largely unable to confirm compliance with the standard represented by the certification mark. 120 That task is left with the certification mark owner, yet certification mark owners often collect revenue from the use of the mark. This creates a conflict of interest in which the organization charged with ensuring that only complying products bear the mark is the same as that receiving revenue from use of the mark. 121 U.S. law lacks a robust system of oversight for checking and monitoring compliance with standards represented by the certification marks. 122 This lack, combined with high levels of complexity and limited transparency into the certification process lead to consumer ignorance and confusion over certification marks, leaving little to deter unscrupulous and overzealous use of certification marks.
123
To address this and other issues, Chon proposes various changes to the statutory framework governing certification marks, including a requirement that greater information about the standards underlying certification marks be disclosed by registrants, an expansion of the doctrines of trademark "abandonment" and misuse to certification marks, and the allowance of various consumer actions against both holders of certification marks and entities applying those marks in the case of fraud, deceit and false marking. 124 It remains to be seen whether these suggestions gain traction within the standards community or are taken up by legislators and consumer advocacy groups and ultimately embodied in law.
Conclusion
Technical standards are likely to play an increasingly prominent role in the development, adoption and regulation of technologies relating to climate change and clean energy. And whether such standards relate to the chemical composition of new biofuels, sustainability characteristics of new buildings or the exchange of data among smart grid components, intellectual property rights will play a key role in determining which of these standards are broadly adopted, and at what price.
